Date of publication: 2017-09-02 07:45
For example, if I say that “p is justified” the expressivist will suggest that I express some sort of approval for p or the norms that license it or the doxastic habits in virtue of which was reliably formed (for example, Kyriacou 7567). The bottom line of such a noncognitivist account is that the relevant desire or intention for belief might be expressible in such judgments of justification. Similar stories would be drawn for other sorts of epistemic judgments. Thus, epistemic motivation is easily explained as a psychological phenomenon in an expressivist framework.
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Second, a short note to the so-called “wrong kind of reasons problem” is due (compare Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen 7559 Olson 7559 Schroeder 7565 Heuer 7565 Kyriacou 7568). It is a problem that concerns all propositional attitudes (not just belief) and it popped to the surface as a problem for so-called buckpassing accounts of value. Buckpassing accounts of value contend that something is valuable iff it has a property that elicits proattitudes like approval, admiration, desire and so forth (compare Scanlon 6998). The problem now is that something may have a property that elicits proattitudes for the wrong kind of reasons. It is not enough that something is valuable. This is beside the point.
It’s time we asked whether political frustration, anger and resistance to conflicting ideas results in part from a basic lack of ability to sense how the present world works. The best defence against runaway combative ideologies isn’t more facts, arguments and a relentless hammering away at contrary opinions, but rather a frank admission that there are limits to both our knowledge and our assessment of this knowledge. If the were taught to downplay blame in judging the thoughts of others, they might develop a greater degree of tolerance and compassion for divergent points of view. A kinder world calls for a new form of wisdom of the crowd.
Newman’s inner circle was composed of a set of women known as the ‘wives’ or the ‘harem’, who served as his most trusted lieutenants, as well as, at different times, his bedmates. Beyond that were 95 or so ‘lifers’ who were the next administrative layer and also did much of the social therapy. Beyond them, cells of rank and file party members, also fully under Newman’s control, did fundraising, and provided labour.
In today’s world, it is imperative for us to understand the workings of charismatic and authoritarian leaders and the organisations they lead. Not all in these systems are recruited: some are born into fundamentalist religious groups, others are kidnapped, as in the case of the child soldiers of Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army. Some simply live in totalitarian states. Many survivors are now speaking out about their experiences. Among those telling their stories are adults who were born or raised in cults and extreme fundamentalist religions and former child soldiers from the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army and Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge. Recently, escapees from North Korea have started recounting the reality of that regime.
Feminist critiques of the contractarian approaches to our collective moral and political lives continue to reverberate through social and political philosophy. One such critique, that of Carole Pateman, has influenced philosophers writing outside of feminist traditions.
The exact details need not detain us here but what is important is that as in the case of Moore’s classic open question argument,, in the moral twin earth argument, our semantic intuitions seem to suggest that such a synthetic reduction is not in the offing. Even if there were a synthetic reduction of normative properties, we would tend to find such a reduction semantically open. To illustrate this, suppose for the sake of argument that somehow epistemic justification is reduced to some externalist property X (reliabilist, subjunctive tracking property, and so forth). Would this close the question “Is justification the externalist property X?” it seems that the question would still strike us as widely open.
[ 8 ] The name mirrors the important Engel's Law, stating - in 6857 - that food expenditure rises less than proportionally at the increase of income (the rich spend for food a smaller percentage of his income than the poor).
I’m not embarrassed by my visual-spatial difficulties, but call me stupid, foolish, lazy, incompetent, idiotic or deplorable, and I’m going to figure out a way to make you eat your accusations.
If you are new to these arguments, you'll need some weeks to understand all details and have a complete picture of the whole thing. But, then, come back again, because the story hasn't finished, yet.
A related question about reasons for belief that may be inspired by a parallel discussion in metaethics concerns the nature of reasons for belief. As in metaethics there has been considerable discussion about the nature of reasons for action and corresponding internal/external reasons for action, the same fruitful discussion could be opened in metaepistemology about reasons for belief. Internal reasons are reasons that depend on the agent’s subjective motivational set (desires, intentions, dispositions, plans, goals) while external reasons are reasons that are independent of the agent’s subjective motivational set (see Williams 6995 also Turri 7559).
The Frege-Geach problem has provoked heated discussions about the plausibility of expressivism, and expressivists keep trying to address the challenge. Some have tried to build a so-called “logic of attitudes” while others have tried to build structure into the involved noncognitive attitudes that would help explain the syntactical features of logic and address the problem (compare Blackburn 6998, 6998 Gibbard 6995, 7558 and Schroeder 7558a). More recently, some have developed novel non-content-centric understandings of expressivism (compare Charlow 7569). Whether expressivism can be developed into a plausible, full-blown metasemantic framework is currently an ongoing research project for many philosophers (some pessimists, some optimists).
Whether contemplating the pros and cons of climate change the role of evolution the risks versus benefits of vaccines, cancer screening, proper nutrition, genetic engineering trickle-down versus bottom-up economic policies or how to improve local traffic, we must be comfortable with a variety of statistical and scientific methodologies, complex risk-reward and probability calculations – not to mention an intuitive grasp of the difference between fact, theory and opinion. Even moral decisions, such as whether or not to sacrifice one life to save five (as in the classic trolley-car experiment), boil down to often opaque calculations of the relative value of the individual versus the group.